In der Nähe von Carlsbad, New Mexico, befindet sich eines von drei Hochrisiko-Lagern in Salzbergwerken für radioaktiven Müll auf der Welt.
Die anderen beiden sind Morsleben, das bekanntlich durch den Zusammenbruch einer Lagerkammer inzwischen unbrauchbar ist, und die leidlich bekannte Asse II, wo die Lagerkammern zur Zeit allmählich durch eindringendes Wasser abzusaufen drohen. Wie auch bei den deutschen Vorbildern handelt es sich um ein Gebirge, in dem bereits seit langem Salzabbau betrieben wird. (Name: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) In der letzte Zeit wird versucht, auch hochradioaktiven Müll so umzudeklarieren, dass er in Carlsbad gelagert werden kann.
Carlsbad wird seit den siebziger Jahren erkundet und gebaut. Mehrfach mussten die Pläne geändert werden, aber trotz der Gefahr durch Laugenseen, die sich unter den Lagerkammern befinden, wurde 1999 mit der Einlagerung von Müll begonnen. Hier werden sogenannte „Transurane“ eingelagert, also Müll, der künstlich durch Kernspaltung erzeugte Isotope wie Plutonium, Americium etc. enthält. Viele dieser Isotope haben lange Halbwertszeiten und sind Alphastrahler. Zur Zeit arbeiten in dem strukturschwachen Gebiet ca. 800 Menschen in und für das Hochrisikolager.
Am 5. Februar hat sich ein Unfall in dem Bergwerk ereignet, der ein Licht auf die Verhältnisse in der Anlage wirft: Es ist ein großer Muldenkipper / LKW in Brand geraten, so dass die Mine evakuiert werden musste. Dabei erlitten sechs Bergleute Rauchvergiftungen und mussten im Krankenhaus behandelt werden. Zum Glück hat sich der Vorfall etwa einen Kilometer von den Kammern mit radioaktivem Müll entfernt ereignet. Der anschließende öffentliche Streit zwischen der Betreibergesellschaft und dem Energieministerium sagt aber einiges über das Sicherheitsniveau der Anlage aus: Das Energieministerium wirft der privaten Betreibergesellschaft vor, dass der Lastwagen völlig verdreckt war und keine routinemäßigen Reinigungen durchgeführt werden, so dass sich Öl am Katalysator entzünden konnte. Die Betreibergesellschaft wiederum beschwert sich, dass sie schon lange Investitionsmittel gefordert haben, um den mehr als dreißig Jahre alten Fuhrpark zu erneuern, aber das Ministerium kein Geld rausrückt. Auf jeden Fall wurde die Anlage nach dem Vorfall erst einmal geschlossen und es wurde kein weiterer Müll angenommen.
Am 14. Februar kurz vor Mittag ereignete sich ein weiterer Vorfall. Es wurde im Abluftsystem des Bergwerks Radioaktivität gemessen – es befanden sich aber keine Menschen im Bergwerk. Das Bergwerk wurde geschlossen und die knapp 200 Arbeiter im oberirdischen Teil der Anlage durften vorübergehend bis zum Nachmittag des folgenden Tages die Gebäude, in denen sie sich befanden, nicht verlassen. Die Arbeiter wurden vor dem Verlassen auf Radioaktivität getestet, es wurde aber keine gefunden. Am 26. Februar (also 12 Tage nach dem Vorfall) wurde allerdings bekannt gegeben, dass 13 Arbeiter mit ‚Spuren‘ von Plutonium und ‚geringen Mengen‘ von Americium-241 verseucht sind. Welche Folgen das für die ArbeiterInnen haben kann, haben die Verantwortlichen nicht bekannt gegeben. Auf Nachfrage der Gewerkschaft gaben die Betreiber bekannt, dass sich jeder Arbeiter testen lassen könne, sie das allerdings nicht für nötig halten. Dies war eine Fehleinschätzung, denn am 8. März wurde bei vier weiteren Arbeitern Radioaktivität im Stuhlgang nachgewiesen, inzwischen ist die Zahl der Betroffenen auf 21 angestiegen.
In der Zwischenzeit wurde eine fieberhafte Suche nach der Ursache des Radioaktivitäts-Ausbruchs gestartet – bis jetzt ist nicht klar, was die Ursache ist. Zwei Thesen gelten als möglich, allerdings sagt das Energieministerium, dass beide Ereignisse eine so geringe Wahrscheinlichkeit haben, dass sie nur einmal in 10.000 bis 100.000 Jahren auftreten:
- Das Dach oder die Wand einer Kammer ist eingestürzt und hat dabei einen oder mehrere Behälter beschädigt. Dazu muss man wissen, dass Kritiker des Hochrisikolagers in diesem Salzstock angeführt haben, dass sich in der Nähe des Salzstocks eine Verwerfungszone befindet, in der die Gesteinsschichten fast senkrecht verlaufen. Und die touristische Sensation von Carlsbad sind die Karsthöhlen in der Nähe der Stadt. All das zeugt nicht gerae von geologischer Stabilität. Ganz so unwahrscheinlich ist so ein Ereignis also nicht.
- Es ist in einem Lagerbehälter zu einer Knallgasexplosion gekommen. Da die Müllbehälter auch flüssige Anteile enthalten, kann das enthaltene Wasser durch ‚Radiolyse‘, also radioaktive Bestrahlung in Wasserstoff und Sauerstoff getrennt werden. Solch ein Gasgemisch kann sich bei der geringsten Energiezufuhr oder auch spontan entzünden. In der Anfangszeit wurde jeder Behälter darauf geprüft, ob sich dieses sogenannte ‚Deckelgas‘ im oberen Teil des Behälters gesammelt hat. Darauf wurde später aus Kostengründen verzichtet. Aktuell werden nur noch Stichproben genommen, das heißt es wird von jedem gleichartigen Lagergut nur ein Behälter geprüft.
Auch bis heute ist nicht bekannt, was da unten passiert ist. Am 7. und 8. März wurden erste Sonden in das Bergwerk herabgelassen, um die Radioaktivität zu messen. Es wurde dabei keine nennenswerte Belastung gefunden. Da es sich aber um langlebige Isotope handelt, die freigesetzt wurden, heißt das nur, dass die radioaktiven Partikel zum Beispiel durch die Lüftungsanlage verteilt oder durch die Abluft an die Umgebung abgegeben wurden. Das freut zwar die Betreiber, weil sie sich Hoffnung machen, das Lager im Juni wieder eröffnen zu können, beruhigend ist das aber nicht.
Ab 2. April sind zwei Crews aus acht Menschen in das Bergwerk eingestiegen, um Messungen unter Tage zu machen und ein Basislager für die weiteren Untersuchungen einzurichten.
Es wird noch eine ganze Weile dauern, bis Klarheit darüber herrscht, was dort vorgefallen ist.
Quellen / Links:
Chronik der Ereignisse aus der Lokalzeitung:
Feb. 5: A truck used to haul salt mined at WIPP catches fire underground shortly before 11 a.m. Salt mining operations occur only in the facility’s north mine, while all transuranic waste is disposed in the south mine. All employees underground at the time are immediately evacuated above ground. Six employees are treated for smoke inhalation at Carlsbad Medical Center. WIPP stops all waste receipts from cleanup sites around the nation and quits disposing of all waste.
Feb. 14: Continuous air monitors, or CAMs, detect traces of airborne radiation underground at WIPP, downwind of Panel 7, Room 7 where transuranic waste is stored in the facility’s south salt mine. Detection of radiation occurs at about 11:30 p.m. and 139 workers on site are sequestered in their normal working buildings. All non-essential personnel are allowed to leave after being screened for radioactive particles by 5:30 p.m. the following day. All tests are negative and no workers were underground at the time.
Feb. 19: Air filter tests by the Carlsbad Environmental Monitoring and Research Center show that trace amounts of americium and plutonium had escaped from the underground at WIPP and were detected about a half mile away from the facility. The air filters had been in place from Feb. 11 to Feb. 16. A second air sampling station about 12 miles southeast of WIPP shows no detection of radioactive particles according to CEMRC, a division of the College of Engineering at New Mexico State University.
Feb. 20: New Mexico Environment Department secretary Ryan Flynn criticizes the DOE during a media conference for its lack of communication with the state about the radiation leak. According to NMED Communications Director Jim Winchester, DOE notified the state about the incident only slightly before the Current-Argus broke the news story.
Feb. 24: Environmental samples collected and analyzed in and around WIPP show no contamination risk for Southeast New Mexico residents, according to the DOE. Carlsbad Mayor Dale Janway hosts the first town hall meeting at the Pecos River Village Conference Center for the public to speak directly with DOE officials about WIPP.
Feb. 26: Preliminary health tests released by the DOE show 13 employees at WIPP tested positive for trace amounts of americium and plutonium.
Feb. 27: Rick Fuentes, president of the United Steel Workers 12-9477 and who represents many of the employees at WIPP, questions the immediate handling of the radiation leak by the DOE. During a media conference, DOE officials say they are encouraging workers to get tested for radiation but not requiring the tests of all employees.
March 4: The Department of Energy and states across the country that ship transuranic nuclear waste to WIPP admit there are preliminary talks for alternative disposal methods should WIPP not open in time to meet obligatory dates for waste cleanup. However, the DOE said it is still committed to meeting its cleanup deadline of June 30 for the waste at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
March 6: New Mexico Sens. Tom Udall and Martin Heinrich and Rep. Steve Pearce meet with Department of Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz in Washington, D.C. All three ask for better communications with Carlsbad residents and the public at-large during the late-afternoon meeting. Shortly after, the DOE creates a new Twitter account specifically for updates about the facility (@WIPPNEWS) and revamps its website.
March 6: David Klaus, deputy undersecretary for management and performance, and David Huizenga, senior advisor for the DOE’s Office of Environmental Management, answer questions about the radiation leak and its impact on locals after traveling from Washington, D.C. to Carlsbad. Carlsbad Mayor Dale Janway announces that he will host a town hall every week for the local community to discuss WIPP updates.
March 7: Congressman Steve Pearce hosts a town hall meeting for those who have lingering questions about the WIPP situation.
March 7-8: Workers lower instruments below ground at WIPP for the first time since the reported radiation leak. The unmanned instruments take scans for radiation levels and air quality samples at the salt handling and air intake shafts which scientists believ to have been spared from contamination. The samples come back negative, confirming assumptions.
March 8: Additional tests of WIPP employees show four additional workers tested positive for americium and plutonium. Fecal samples of 17 workers test positive for radioactive particles but urine tests are negative, indicating that contamination wasn’t absorbed into the blood stream, according to DOE.
Lokalzeitung zur aktuellen Entwicklung:
Und die Kritiker der Lokalzeitung (habe ich angehängt, da er ganz informativ ist):
Artikel aus Nature:
Artikel aus der New York Times zur Situation der ca. 800 ArbeiterInnen im WIPP:
Hintergrundartikel aus Bulletin of Atomic Scientists:
Dort gibt es auch einen Hintergrundartikel zu Fukushima unter:
Wikipedia-Info zum Hochrisikolager Carlsbad (WIPP):
(besonders niedlich der Absatz am Ende über die Kennzeichnung der Gegend als radioaktive ‚No-Go‘-Zone)
WIPP: Reconsidering the ‘Impossible’
April 1st, 2014 · No Comments · environment
By Denise Tessier
Before the leak, a radiation incident at WIPP was considered virtually impossible. . .
That’s a line from the Journal’s March 27 editorial in which the Albuquerque Journal revealed a collective change of heart about the infallibility of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, the only existing repository for the nation’s transuranic U.S. defense nuclear waste.
Apparently it took the “impossible” for this editorial change.
Which begs the question: Why consider a radiation leak impossible?
Taking every precaution is imperative when dealing with these highly toxic, long-lived wastes. But even if WIPP’s managers had maintained their initial safety culture and record – which, according to a report by federal investigators, had declined in recent years – to consider any leak “impossible” reflects an almost faith-based trust in WIPP.
The Albuquerque Journal has consistently been a booster of WIPP, even before the plant opened more than 15 years ago. Because of its economic benefits, bolstered by the safety record of its first decade or so, it also has enjoyed strong support from southern New Mexico Rep. Steve Pearce and Carlsbad residents like Mayor Dale Janway.
The Valentine’s Day leak of radiation — revealed Feb. 19 during ongoing air sampling by the Carlsbad Environmental Monitoring Center at an exhaust shaft about a half mile from WIPP — led to closure of WIPP from further acceptance of waste, pending investigation. The Journal’s first editorial after the leak (Feb. 25) was headlined, “Base WIPP response on science, not emotions.”
Perhaps it was meant as a simple admonition against panic, but the headline and text in the editorial on which it was based employed an unfortunate choice of words. They were almost preemptive in intention, implying that those who might publicly express concern would be expressing emotion rather than rational thought.
At the same time, the text of the editorial agreed with the reaction of New Mexico’s newly appointed Environment Secretary Ryan Flynn, who at a news conference, reported in the Journal Feb. 21, said, “Events like this simply should never occur. From the state’s perspective, one event is far too many.”
Flynn also said the Environment Department would take into account the radiation release – and a truck fire at WIPP that had occurred Feb. 5 – when evaluating future permit applications for expansion of WIPP or for acceptance of additional waste stream types.
Flynn’s role in writing copper industry regulations on water aside, his response to the WIPP leak as ED secretary was a welcome one. It reminded this reader of Robert Neill’s Environmental Evaluation Group in the late 1970s and early ‘80s, which, along with the New Mexico Environmental Improvement Division, acted as watchdogs for the public when the federal government was proposing that New Mexico accept this waste. The EEG and EID provided a science-based foil for the anti-nuclear and the pro-nuclear groups that both sprang up then.
Three days after the Journal’s Feb. 25 editorial, it was revealed that 13 workers inhaled radiation above ground during the leak. Department of Energy officials issued a statement a few days later, reported by John Fleck on March 6, saying that a second round of tests showed none of the 13 were exposed to dangerous levels of plutonium or americium, the two elements detected in February.
But as WIPP critic Don Hancock of the Southwest Information and Research Center pointed out in Fleck’s story, urine tests would not detect whether the employees had radioactive lung exposure, a more pressing concern. During an interview with V.B. Price at New Mexico Mercury, Hancock also questioned who among those at the Department of Energy were medical experts, but said he’d received no answer.
Four days later, it was reported that four more workers had tested positive for exposure at WIPP. The levels were “barely detectable,” according to the story based on a DOE new release.
Still unknown was what caused the release, and Fleck wrote a story explaining various scenarios, including those considered in WIPP’s Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement from the 1990s. In this story, he interviewed Neill from the EEG, who said leaks were never supposed to happen. The story concluded with a New Mexico Environment Department legal notice, which said, “It is believed . . . that the WIPP will be unable to resume normal activities for a protracted period of time.”
In the Sunday Journal, March 16, staffer Lauren Villagran summarized the continuing support the town of Carlsbad has for WIPP, reporting that WIPP’s budget includes more than $45 million in salaries, which certainly bolsters the local business community. The story, “Carlsbad stands strong for WIPP,” also brought up the issue of clean-up: “With the investigation into the source and extent of the leak ongoing, it is not yet clear how much the cleanup will cost.”
In that same newspaper, the Journal Op-Ed Page carried a piece headlined, “Radiation levels after WIPP leak negligible,” which echoed the Journal’s Feb. 25 editorial with its message and subhead: “People should look to experts for good information rather than turning to fear and panic.” The expert in this case was the author of the piece, Robert Hayes, listed as a certified health physicist. His column said:
The highest contamination levels predicted off-site right at the fence are so low, they are effectively identical to the values that were already there prior to building the WIPP due to global fallout from historical atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.
And he added:
Fear has historically been one of the greatest dangers when it comes to any upset condition at a nuclear facility. The only deaths recorded from the very large radioactivity release from Fukushima were due to unnecessary evacuations resulting in deaths from clinical issues like accidents and hospital patients not receiving proper care during the move.
Full disclosure: I was at the WIPP site for two weeks after the event and have been keenly aware of all the radiation measurements, characterization and assessments that took place there. The event is truly an operational nightmare for a facility that had always prided itself on a stellar record of disciplined operations and excellence in mission execution.
Opposite that column, the Journal again weighed in on the incident with an editorial, which this time was headlined, “N.M. awaits answers for radiation leak at WIPP.” This raised a question as to whether contingency plans were in place.
But its focus was more about the potential fallout in terms of whether WIPP would still be able to accept waste from agencies other than the DOE.
Keep in mind that when New Mexico agreed to take on the responsibility of storing federal nuclear defense waste for the rest of the nation, it did so after being promised that New Mexico would not be asked to take other types of waste – a promise that has been ignored as an inconvenient technicality every time yet another proposal is made for expansion.
In the interview with Price, Hancock said New Mexico has received no fewer than six proposals to expand the mission of WIPP – to include high-level waste, commercial and power plant waste and even non-nuclear things, like 10,000 metric tons of mercury.
In fact, Hancock suggested that the “declining safety culture” at WIPP partly could be blamed on management’s desire to increase the mission. Dealing with expansion proposals costs time and money, he said, to the point that some salt beds have been mined and installed with heaters specifically to demonstrate that salt beds are suitable for long-term storage of hotter radioactive wastes.
Again, New Mexico was promised that it would not have to take on such waste. The Journal’s March 16 editorial ignored this history, pointing out “WIPP’s importance to the nation and economic impact to the state,” its employment of about 1,200 people and its budget of $202 million. It then indirectly expressed its support for expansion, adding for good measure that:
WIPP doesn’t need the kind of over-the-top, choking and incredibly costly safety regulatory structure the National Nuclear Security Agency has brought to the national labs. …
The implausibility of this statement was noticed by Ernest Hardin of Corrales, who in a letter published in the Talk of the Town section March 25 wrote:
An effective nuclear safety culture is exactly what WIPP needs. The truck fire is indisputable evidence that a culture problem exists, and experience shows that such problems are not limited to the particular failure that brings them to light.
Saying he worked at the Yucca Mountain Project “many years,” he added:
Nuclear safety culture . . . is vital to all radioactive waste management facilities including the national labs. So please learn more about nuclear safety culture before editorializing. You might start with the documents provided by INPO, the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations.
And that brings us to the March 27 editorial about the impossibility of a radiation incident – and to the Journal’s better grasp of the importance of maintaining a nuclear safety culture. As supporting evidence for its editorial position, it cited the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board report that said WIPP was unprepared in its response to both the truck fire and the leak, and that an investigation of the truck fire turned up serious operational and safety problems.
The editorial again brought up the permitting of non-DOE waste at WIPP, and this time decided to support the Environment Department’s decision to hold off on expansion permits. From the editorial, “Holding off on WIPP permit changes is wise:”
Putting the permit modification on hold is the right call. It makes no sense to approve more nuclear waste for the repository when already approved WIPP shipments are on hold and no one knows what caused the radiation breach.
However, answers are needed soon to prevent a reoccurrence, and before WIPP reopens.
Still unclear is the extent of contamination, and how it is to be remediated. As Hancock pointed out in the Mercury interview, there is no history, anywhere in the world, of what to do in a situation like this.
The Journal would do well to keep the blinders off as new developments unfold.